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INTRODUCTION
Online fraud is estimated to cost individuals and companies billions of dollars each year (Internet
Crime Complaint Center 2017; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2016), and is one
of the most common types of cybercrime encountered by national police agencies across the world
(UN 2013). As such, several scholars and reports rate online fraud as the greatest threat to ecommerce (Jotwani and Dutta 2016; Internet Crime Complaint Center 2014). While online fraud can
take different forms, including auto-fraud scams, online dating romance scams, extortion scams, and
auction scams (Whitty 2013; Grabosky 2015), online non-payment and non-delivery scams have been
among the most common and costly forms of online fraud during the last three years. Indeed, in both
2016 and 2017, more than 80,000 victims in the United States alone have lost more than $140 million
annually to non-payment/non-delivery frauds (Internet Crime Complaint Center 2017).
Still, despite the growing public and legal interest in online fraud and in its consequences to
individuals and business, the criminological literature has yet to study fraudsters’ Modus Operandi
throughout the progression of an online scam (Holt and Graves 2007; Lea, Fischer, and Evans 2009),
and their responses to situational stimuli during the progression of the criminal event. To address this
empirical gap, we draw on the criminal event perspective (Luckenbill 1977; Felson and Steadman
1983; Short 1998) to investigate how consistent is the use of “urgency” cues among online fraudsters
when they attempt to defraud potential targets. Specifically, building on past research that focuses on
fraudsters’ deceptive strategies (Ferreira and Lenzini 2015; Atkins and Huang 2013), and drawing on
claims from the Interpersonal Deception Theory (Buller and Burgoon 1996), we explore whether
verbal and non-verbal cues of urgency are presented consistently to online fraud targets throughout
the progression of an online non-payment fraud attempt. Moreover, integrating situational
explanations of crime (Briar and Pilavin 1965; Osgood et al. 1996) with Buller and Burgoon’s (1996)
claims, we explore whether fraudsters react to the emergence of situations conducive to online fraud
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by increasing the presentation of urgency cues throughout the progression of an online non-payment
fraud attempt.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Online fraud
With the expansion of the online environment, the Internet has become a popular medium for scams,
connecting fraudsters with numerous potential targets (Pratt et al. 2010; Grabosky 2015; Reyns et al.
2016). Indeed, various types of online fraud have been developed by scammers, including sales and
investment frauds (Grabosky et al. 2001), fraudulent ordering of goods (US Department of Justice
2004), auction frauds (Bailey 2009), romance scams (Whitty 2013; Whitty 2015a), and online
advance fee frauds (Grabosky 2015). Among the numerous types of online frauds, non-payment and
non-delivery frauds are among the most diverse (i.e., facilitated in different ways), common, and
costly (Grabosky 2015; Internet Crime Complaint Center 2017).
Online non-payment frauds are scams in which goods and services are shipped to a potential
buyer (consistent with the buyer’s request), but payment is never received (Internet Crime Complaint
Center 2017). Specifically, online fraudsters look for legitimate users’ posts of “for sale” items on
classified advertisement websites, and respond to legitimate ads via email or phone (Aleem and AtwiBoasiako 2011). Once establishing the availability of a potential target, the scammer agrees to pay for
the advertised product and sends a fake payment receipt (e.g. Paypal receipt) to the target (Aleem and
Atwi-Boasiako 2011). If the potential target is defrauded, the victim sends out the goods to the
scammer, yet receives no actual payment in return. In contrast, in an online non-delivery fraud, a
payment is sent to a potential seller, but goods and services are never received (Internet Crime
Complaint Center 2017). Under this type of scam, online scammers advertise an item, a real estate
property, or a service over classified advertisement websites (e.g. “Craigslist.com” or
“Backpage.com”), and wait for potential targets to contact them regarding the listing either over
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email or phone (Button and Cross 2017). Once a potential target contacts the scammers, the online
offenders push the target to send a certain amount of money for either purchasing the product or
service or securing the rights to the real estate.
As in offline fraud events, fraudsters commonly employ urgency cues in their attempts to
initiate online non-payment /non-delivery scams. Specifically, online fraudsters take advantage of
heuristics in decision-making that are associated with peripheral processing (Johnson et al. 1993;
Cowan 1986), and attempt to create a sense of urgency among potential victims by presenting very
attractive offers that are presumably available only for a short time (Lea et al. 2009; Doocy et al
2001; Shichor et al. 2001). Indeed, several analyses of the content of fraudulent emails (for instance
spam emails) indicate that online scammers almost always employ urgency cues during their efforts
to lure potential victims into compliance (Atkins and Huang 2013; Holt and Graves 2007).
Unfortunately, although this past research has advanced our understanding of the strategies used by
online scammers to deceive their victims (Wang et al. 2012), these studies tend to draw on
problematic samples (Ferreira et al 2015; Holt and Graves 2007), and provide no information
regarding the interaction between the scammers and the victim throughout the progression of the
criminal event (Atkins and Huang 2015; Ferreira and Lenzini 2015). As a result, no attention has
been given to identifying the important cues that trigger offenders to pursue or abort fraud attempts.
Moreover, these studies analyzed the content of unsolicited spam emails that are designed to reduce
the number of replies from individuals who are unlikely to fall victim to these scams (Herley 2012).
To address these empirical gaps, we explore how online fraud is perpetrated and perpetuated
(Holtfreter et al. 2005), focusing on the multiple communications between online scammers and
victims. To frame these communications, we adopt the criminal event perspective (Lukenbill 1977;
Meier, Kennedy, and Sacco 2001) and draw on “Interpersonal Deception Theory” (Buller and
Burgoon 1996) to form hypotheses regarding the role of criminal opportunities (Briar and Pilavin
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1965) in conditioning the effect of initial deception displays of urgency on subsequent deceptive
cues.
The Criminal Event Perspective and Interpersonal Deception Theory
The criminal event perspective focuses attention on the microsocial level of illegal behaviors, and
goes beyond offenders’ motivation to include insights regarding all parts of the etiology of crime,
including the interaction between criminal events participants, the unfolding of criminal events, and
the settings in which these events occur (Short 1998). Originating in the symbolic interactionist
perspective (Goffman 1955), this approach suggests that a comprehensive explanation of crime
should incorporate knowledge regarding the way offenders and victims present themselves and
interact, and that the settings in which these interactions occur shape the interactive process between
actors (Meier, Kennedy, and Sacco 2001). However, although advocates of the criminal event
perspective believe this approach is relevant for all types of predatory crimes, prior studies employing
this perspective have only focused on the interactional processes leading to violent offenses
(Luckenbill 1977; Felson and Steadman 1983; Fagan and Wilkinson 1998; Deibert and Miethe 2003).
Moreover, these studies do not draw on a cohesive theoretical model that allows for the development
of clear research hypotheses regarding the interactions between offenders and victims, as well as the
progression of the criminal event. We believe that Interpersonal Deception Theory (Buller and
Burgoon 1994) can fill this theoretical void, and prove useful in understanding the interaction
between fraudsters and targets during the progression of a criminal event.
The underlying premise of Interpersonal Deception Theory (Buller and Burgoon 1994, 1996;
Burgoon and Buller 2015) is that social interactions involve a dynamic exchange of both verbal (i.e.
linguistic and content cues (Carlson et al. 2004)) and non-verbal messages between senders and
receivers, who influence each other in an interdependent fashion (White and Burgoon 2001).
Deception, in this sense, occurs when a deceiver controls the presentation of information (including
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the transmission of verbal and non-verbal messages, as well as the manipulation of situational cues)
in an effort to change a target’s beliefs in a way that the deceiver knows is dishonest (Buller and
Burgoon 1994). According to Buller and Burgoon (1994; 1996), deceptive communication is similar
to normative communication, since it requires active participation from both the deceiver and the
target, and since it involves the presentation of both strategic and non-strategic behaviors (Goffman
1969). Non-strategic behaviors are unintentional and unconscious actions that are presented by a
sender during the progression of an interaction. Strategic behaviors, on the other hand, are purposive
actions that involve intentionality and conscious awareness. Buller and Burgoon (1996) contended
that since deceivers engage in activities designed to manage information, behavior, and image, they
are more likely to display strategic behaviors than truth tellers1 (Burgoon, Proudfoot, Schuetzler, and
Wilson 2014). However, to increase their credibility and evade detection, deceivers accept feedback
regarding their own performance from those they interact with (i.e. their potential victims), and react
to signs of suspicion by modifying their behaviors accordingly (see also Goffman 1955).
Interpersonal Deception Theory and The Online Environment
Although several studies investigated the way in which initial deception cues shape deceivers’
behaviors along the progression of deceptive interactions in an offline environment (Burgoon, Buller,
White, Afifi, and Buslig 1999; White and Burgoon 2001), only scant research has been devoted to
how computer mediated environments influence communication patterns between deceivers and
targets throughout the progression of online criminal events (Pak and Zhou 2014). This is unfortunate
because several scholars believe that the low level of context interactivity facilitated by computing
environments provides fertile ground for norm breaking and deception. Carlson and associates (2004)
argued that low interactivity communication platforms like email and text messaging support the
development of deceptive behavior by allowing communicators to monitor only a few
communication channels, and consequently simplify offenders’ efforts to synchronize and coordinate
5

the social cues they transmit over these channels. In contrast, other scholars believe that although
non-verbal cues such as facial expression (Goffman 1955) and vocal pitch cannot be transmitted over
a text-based interaction, other non-verbal cues can be transmitted to convey senders’ feelings and
emotions (Kotlyar and Ariely 2013). For example, Byron and Bladrige (2007) showed that emails
written in all capital letters could convey senders’ feelings of anger and urgency. Similarly, Kalman
and Gergle (2014) demonstrated that letter repetition as an extension of a word (e.g. “sooo” and
“thaaanks”) is used to convey emotional nuance.
In line with the growing arguments that computer-mediated communications can transfer both
verbal and non-verbal social cues, numerous studies have investigated the relationships between
verbal and non-verbal cues and different types of online deception (Pak and Zhou 2014; Hauch,
Blandon-Gitlin, Masip, and Sporer 2015). In general, most of these studies found that certain verbal
and non-verbal communication cues are associated with deceptive behaviors. For example, Ho and
colleagues (2015) reported that online deceivers are more likely to avoid using the words “no” and
“not” while interacting with other online users than truth-tellers. Similarly, Derrick and colleagues
(2013) found that deceivers had longer response latencies when interacting with online users over
chat-based platforms than truth-tellers.
Despite this research, only a few studies have focused on the interactive exchanges between
deceivers and targets, and even less research has investigated how deceivers’ initial presentation of
deceptive behaviors is correlated with their subsequent behaviors during the progression of the online
crime (Pak and Zhou 2014). Moreover, only a few of these studies collected data from online users
while preserving the context in which deceit takes place (Kotlyar and Ariely 2013), and none of them
analyzed data collected from online criminals. Similarly, no previous study has tested how fraudsters
identify criminal opportunities through the presentation of deception cues in general, and urgency
cues in particular, during the progression of offline or online criminal events. We suspect that the
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identification of a criminal opportunity could influence offenders’ situational motivation to pursue a
criminal event (Briar and Piliavin 1965), and shape offenders’ presentations of both verbal and
nonverbal deceptive cues throughout the progression of the online criminal event.
Offline and Online Situations Conducive to Crime
The role of environmental factors in determining both motivational and situational opportunities to
offend has been discussed extensively in criminological scholarship during the last five decades
(Briar and Piliavin 1965; Clarke 1997). Briar and Piliavin (1965) contended that exposure to
situationally induced stimuli may shape individuals’ morals and behaviors and, in turn, that an
individual’s engagement in a criminal event is the result of situational motivations to offend. More
recently, Osgood and colleagues (1996) have expanded Briar and Piliavin (1965) claims to account
for individual offending and violent behaviors among adolescents and youths. Specifically,
integrating Briar and Piliavin’s (1965) situational conception of delinquent motivation with Cohen
and Felson’s (1979) emphasis on individuals’ daily routines, Osgood and associates (1996) argued
that situations in which deviance is easier and rewarding are likely to increase the probability of
deviant behavior and crime. While Osgood and colleagues (1996) identified unique criminogenic
situations under which juvenile delinquency is likely to ensue (i.e. unstructured socializing with
peers), several scholars have acknowledged the role of criminal opportunities for the development of
fraudulent behaviors. Roberds (1998) suggested that situations in which buyers and sellers do not
have an ongoing business relationship, as well as those in which the payer’s identity cannot be traced,
increase the likelihood of fraud. Moreover, Roberds (1998) contended that situations in which a seller
cannot withhold delivery of an item until the buyer pays in full, and the payment is verified, increase
the probability of fraud. Finally, Osgood and colleagues (1996) acknowledged the role of availability
in the context of income tax fraud, noting that “income tax is impossible without earnings that are
subject to taxation” (639).
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Indeed, several studies have previously emphasized the role of target availability and
suitability in increasing offenders’ situational motivations to offend, and in influencing the likelihood
of a criminal event to occur (Cohen and Felson 1979; Wright and Decker 1994, 2011). Wright and
Decker (1994) reported that burglars prefer to target residential houses that appear to host valuable
items over houses that appear easy to break into. These scholars also observed that when seeking
potential robbery targets, robbers attempt to confirm that the targets carry plenty of cash before
initiating the criminal event (Wright and Decker 2011). Unfortunately, only scant research has tested
the relationships between online situations conducive to crime and online offending. In fact, we were
able to find only one study (Ingram and Hinduja 2008) that emphasized the role of availability of
online targets as a key online situation that increases motivations to engage in crime. Specifically,
Ingram and Hinduja (2008) reported that the availability and accessibility of pirated material in the
online environment increased undergraduate students’ probability to engage in copyright
infringement. Still, consistent with the underlying premise of situational explanations of crime (Briar
and Piliavin 1965; Clarke 1997; Eck and Clarke 2003), and with Wright and Decker’s (1994, 2011)
findings, our work seeks to assess the role of situations conducive to online fraud, and specifically of
confirmed target suitability, in shaping online fraudsters’ deceptive behaviors during the progression
of an online advance fee fraud attempt.
The current study
Since many online scammers employ verbal messages of urgency when contacting their victims with
different fraudulent propositions (Atkins and Huang 2013; Wang et al. 2012), we first aim to assess
how consistent the presentation of verbal cues of urgency is throughout the progression of an online
non-payment fraud attempt. Adopting Goffman’s (1955) claim that inconsistency in how a person
projects himself in society risks embarrassment and discrediting by others, we suspect that in the
absence of suspicion signs among their targets, deceivers are likely to display consistent strategic
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behaviors (Buller and Burgoon 1996). In this sense, we suspect that online scammers who
incorporate verbal cues of urgency in their initial interactions with victims are likely to employ
subsequent verbal cues of urgency along the progression of the online fraud attempt. Thus, our first
research hypothesis suggests that verbal cues of urgency are more likely to appear in follow-up
communications with online fraudsters who incorporated verbal cues of urgency in their initial
communication with a target, compared to follow-up communications from online fraudsters who did
not incorporate verbal cues of urgency in their initial communications with targets.
Relatedly, drawing on Buller and Burgoon’s (1996) assumption that deceivers accept
feedback regarding their own performance from their targets and adjust their behaviors accordingly,
we suspect that upon receiving clear signs of target suitability and online opportunities to defraud,
online scammers believe that the targets have accepted their façade and are ready to comply with the
scammers’ requests. In order to present consistency in their strategic behaviors and avoid raising
suspicion, the scammers will likely continue using verbal messages that they used in previous
interactions with their targets. Therefore, our second hypothesis suggests that confirming target
suitability will increase the probability of verbal cues of urgency in follow-up communications with
online fraudsters who incorporated verbal cues of urgency in their initial probe, compared to when a
feedback regarding target suitability is missing.
Consistent with the assumption that deceivers employ both verbal and non-verbal deceptive
cues during their interaction with victims, we also seek to discover whether initial verbal cues of
urgency are synchronized with subsequent non-verbal cues. Specifically, in line with the assumption
that computer-mediated environments could support the transmission of nonverbal cues (Derrick et
al. 2013), we believe that online scammers may support the urgency façade they are trying to present
to their targets by communicating non-verbal cues of urgency. One type of nonverbal cue of urgency
that is commonly employed by telemarketing fraudsters to create a sense of urgency among their
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victims involves increasing the number of contacts with a target (Shichor et al. 2001). Similarly, we
suspect that online scammers who attempt to create a sense of urgency among their targets will
increase the frequency of their online contact (through emails, IM, etc.) with victims. Thus, our third
research hypothesis suggests that the frequency of repeated communications between scammers who
incorporate verbal cues of urgency in their initial contact with targets will be higher than the
frequency of repeated communications between online scammers who do not incorporate initial
verbal cues of urgency in their initial contact with targets.
Finally, we suspect that confirmation of target suitability may enhance the effect of initial
verbal cues of urgency on the frequency of email communication between online scammers who
employ verbal cues of urgency and potential targets. Specifically, it is possible that targets’
willingness to share details about the availability of situations conducive to crime will be interpreted
by online scammers as a sign of the target’s willingness to comply without expressing suspicion. As
such, the online scammers who employ verbal cues of urgency may believe that there is no need for
them to modify their strategic behaviors (Buller and Burgoon 1996), and instead, may introduce
subsequent non-verbal cues of urgency that coincide with the urgency façade. Therefore, our final
research hypothesis suggests that the frequency of repeated communications with online scammers
will be higher when feedback regarding the availability of suitable target is received by scammers
who incorporate verbal cues of urgency in their initial contact with a target, compared to when a
feedback regarding target suitability is missing.
DATA AND METHODS
In order to provide a clear understanding of the sequence of events during the progression of online
fraud, we followed Deibert and Miethe’s (2003) approach and initiated the collection of processual
data (i.e. data that provides clear temporal sequencing of actions during the progression of a criminal
event) on online non-payment fraud attempts while engaging with the users of an online classified
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advertisement website.
Procedure
Drawing on Kshetri’s (2010) claim that geographic locations play important role in determining
targets attractiveness to online fraud activities, we selected 10 large metropolitan areas (San
Francisco, Seattle, New York, Boston, LA, San Diego, Portland , Washington DC, Chicago, and
Denver) and 10 small towns (Twin Tiers, Cumberland Valley, Meadville, Susanville, Siskiyou,
Hanford-Corcoran, Santa Maria, Winchester, Southwest, and Eastern Colorado) in the U.S.A., where
we advertised the sale of four types of products– cell phones, computers, jewelry, and auto parts–
over the classified advertisement webpages that are designated for serving these locations. Our
decision to advertise our items in both large metropolitans and small towns draws on past research’s
findings suggesting that residents in small towns with low shop accessibility buy and sell products
more often online (Farag et al 2006), and consequently, may be more susceptible to online fraud
activities. Each ad included information on a single item, and the requested price for it. Items’ prices
ranged from $110 to $700. Examples of the type of advertisements we posted under each product
category are presented in Appendix A, Panel A. We decided to post advertisements for these specific
products since we found that these items were popular at Amazon.com. The prices we asked for in
our advertisements for used products were substantially higher than the prices advertised for identical
yet new products on Amazon.com (Alem and Atwi-Boasiako 2011). Our decision to overprice our
items was driven by a “Scam Alert” posted by the Federal Trade Commission’s Consumer Protection
Team, which indicated that online fraudsters respond to “for sale” ads independent of the seller
asking price, while legitimate online consumers are reluctant to reply to posts of overpriced products
(Tuscan 2014).
In order to minimize potential biases in our data collection, we programmed our servers to
post the advertisements in an evenly distributed rate across posting times and product categories.
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Specifically, we posted our ads at a low rate2 of one advertisement per category per city, every 48
hours (Park et al. 2014). By the end of the three-month experimental period (from 4/15/2013 to
7/19/2013), we had posted 1,376 advertisements on the local classified advertisement websites of the
20 selected cities. However, since 747 of these advertisements were flagged and deleted by the
classified advertisement website team, only 629 of the advertisements (an average of 157.3 ads per
product category) remained posted until they expired (typically after 7 days)3.
To enable an email exchange with potential online consumers, we opened 42 new email
accounts,4 periodically checked the 42 inboxes, identified responses to our advertisement, and replied
to all incoming emails with a subject line that directly referenced the subject of our post. To simplify
this process, we looked for a list of eight keywords in the email received in our 42 email inboxes, and
once identifying one or more of these words, generated a predetermined and consistent response that
adequately reacted to each word. For instance, once we identified the word “price” in the potential
online consumer’s email, we generated the following response: “The price is X, firm.” Similarly, if a
potential online consumer asked about the advertised item’s condition in his probe email, we
generated the following response: “The condition is almost perfect since it was not used frequently.”
When multiple words were identified in a single communication, we combined multiple sentences in
a single response. If we identified none of the keywords, no response was sent to the potential online
consumer. Appendix A, Panel B presents the list of keywords we searched in the emails and the
corresponding response we generated to each of these words. The consistent responses we generated
allowed us to exchange multiple rounds of emails with potential online fraudsters. Appendix B, Panel
A presents an example of a typical exchange our team had with online fraudsters. The
communication between the research team and an interested online consumer/fraudster was
terminated if the potential online consumer/fraudster did not respond to our email or if none of the
key words which triggered the research team’s response appeared in the email we received.
12

Importantly, our research design was approved by the IRB committee in the University of Maryland.
Sample
We received a total of 19,204 emails in our 42 email accounts during the experimental period. Of
these, 13,215 emails were initial probe emails sent to us by potential online consumers who were
interested in the items we advertised. The remaining emails received in our inboxes were mainly
spam emails and emails sent from email service providers (e.g. Gmail and Yahoo). From the 13,215
scam-related first responses, we identified 8,048 emails with a subject line that replied directly to the
subject of our post, searched the email body for the relevant keywords, and sent first replies to the
online consumers. By sending a reply to the online consumers, an email thread was automatically
generated in our email inboxes.
We received at least one unique response to 1,140 of the email responses we sent in reply to
inquiries about our ads. Importantly, during our communication with the interested online customers
we received 623 unique emails (making 623 unique email threads) with fake PayPal payment
notifications stating that funds were transferred to our PayPal account, followed by a request for us to
send the relevant product to the consumer’s mailing address. Since none of the PayPal payment
confirmation emails arrived from legitimate PayPal email accounts, and since we never set-up PayPal
accounts for this project, the fake receipts constitute strong evidence that those emails were sent by
online fraudsters. In contrast, the other 517 email threads did not include neither fake payment
notification, nor other signs of fraudulent activity. Therefore, one may suggest that these emails were
sent by legitimate potential online consumers. Since the focus of this paper is on online fraudsters’
deceptive cues, our final sample consists of the 623 email threads that included that fake PayPal
notifications and that were certainly sent by online fraudsters.
Dependent measures
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The unit of analysis in this work is the email thread (i.e. an email message that includes a running list
of all the succeeding replies, starting with the original email), which encompasses the progression of
an online non-payment fraud attempt event. To test our first and second research hypotheses, we
constructed the measure subsequent verbal cues of urgency. Specifically, drawing on the rationale
proposed by the “Manifest Content Analysis” approach (Maruna 2010) and its implementation in the
criminological field (Welch, Fenwick and Roberts 1998), and consistent with the technical operation
of several existing email filters that are designed to identify and classify email urgency (Horvitz and
Apacible 2009), we identified the urgency words “ASAP,” “soon,” and “fast” in email messages we
received from online fraudsters who responded to our conversation engine, and created a dummy
variable indicating the presence of at least one of these words in the email message. Importantly, the
three urgency-keywords we used for constructing this dependent variable are used by bulk-filters to
identify, flag, and classify email messages for urgency and importance (Horvitz and Apacible 2009).
To investigate our third and fourth research hypotheses we created the measure subsequent
non-verbal cues of urgency. Following Shichor and colleagues’ (2001) conceptualization of nonverbal cues of urgency, this measure is a simple count of the number of email responses we received
from online scammers regarding the items we advertised. Consistent with Shichor et al. (2001), we
associate a higher number of emails from a unique online scammer during a unique interaction
regarding a product we advertised as a non-verbal cue of urgency.
Key independent measures
To investigate whether initial presentation of urgency cues determine the presentation of both nonverbal and verbal cues of urgency throughout the progression of online non-payment fraud attempts,
we identified emails received in our email inboxes from potential online scammers that contained at
least one of the three urgency keywords. Specifically, in line with the operation of Horvitz and
Apacible’s (2009) bulk-email filter, we identified the urgency words “ASAP,” “soon,” and “fast” in
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the first emails messages we received from online fraudsters to construct the measure initial verbal
cues of urgency (1= at least one urgency word is present in the scammer’s first email).
To assess how the discovery of target suitability and situations conducive to online fraud
influences the presentation of deception cues throughout the progression of the online criminal event,
we distinguished between probe emails that requested information regarding the condition of the
advertised item and probe emails that did not, and used those probes to construct our measure for
confirmation of target suitability. Specifically, if the online scammers asked about the advertised item
condition in his probe email, we sent the following response: “The condition is almost perfect since it
was not used frequently.” In the absence of this keyword in the probe email, we did not disclose any
information about the item’s condition. Appendix B, Panel B presents examples of probe emails that
received confirmation of target suitability, and of probe emails that did not receive such a response.
Thus, the measure we generated is a binary variable indicating whether or not we sent potential
fraudsters explicit confirmation regarding the item condition (1=information regarding item condition
was sent to scammers).
Control variables
We used a list of measures designed to control for potential influences of the ad’s content on online
scammers’ probability to consistently pursue both verbal and non-verbal cues of urgency. We
generated a list of dummy variables to indicate whether the posted ad offered an auto part, a
cellphone, a computer, or jewelry for sale. The price is a measure of the asking price (in U.S. dollars)
of the item advertised. Finally, since we posted our advertisements in both major metropolitan areas
and small towns, we composed the dummy variable major metropolitan to indicate the location in
which the ad was posted (1= major metropolitan). Means and standard deviations for all the
dependent and independent variables are reported in Table 1.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
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Analytic strategy
To assess the direct and interactive effects of initial verbal cues of urgency and confirmation of target
suitability on our first dependent measure (i.e. subsequent verbal cues of urgency), we estimated a
series of logistic regressions (Long 1997). Due to the positively skewed distribution of our email
contacts count measure, as well as an observed overdispersion when estimating a simple Poisson
model, we employed a series of negative binomial regression models (Osgood 2000), to estimate the
direct and interactive effects of initial verbal cues of urgency and confirmation of target suitability on
the number of emails we received from online scammers (i.e. non-verbal cues or scarcity).
RESULTS
Before investigating our key research hypotheses, we briefly describe our unique sample
characteristics. As presented in Table 1, the most common email thread that was initiated by an
online scammer was initiated in response to the jewelry ads we posted on the classified ad website
(36%), followed by computer ads (28%), cellphone ads (24%), and auto-part ads (12%). Importantly,
18% of the scammers’ probe emails included specific words that are aimed to convey a sense of
urgency on behalf of the scammer, while 20% of the initial probe emails received a confirmation of
target suitability from our research team. Finally, the average number of subsequent email responses
we received during our online engagement with online fraudsters was 2.59 emails, while 70% of the
subsequent emails we received included urgency words.
Turning to our first research hypothesis, we next present findings from a Logit model that
estimates the effect of initial verbal cues of urgency on the probability of subsequent verbal cues of
urgency in follow-up email communications between the online scammers and our research team.
Results from this analysis are presented in Table 2, Model 1. As indicates in the model, scammers’
presentations of verbal cues of urgency in the probe email increases the odds ratio for the appearance
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of verbal cues of urgency in subsequent email communications between the online scammers and our
team. However, this effect is only marginally significant (p < 0.1).
To test our second research hypothesis, we specify an interaction term between initial verbal
cues of urgency and confirmation of target suitability, and estimate its effect on the probability that
subsequent verbal cues of urgency will be presented by online scammers during the progression of an
online non-payment fraud attempt. Findings from this analysis are reported in Table 2, Model 2. As
indicated in the model, the interaction between confirmation of target suitability and initial verbal
cues of scarcity is significant and positive, suggesting that confirmation of target suitability enhances
the effect of initial verbal cues of urgency on subsequent presentation of verbal cues of urgency.
Next, we re-estimate Model 2 while introducing the list of controls and accounting for their
potential confounding effects on both the dependent and independent variables. Findings from this
model are reported in Table 2, Model 3. As indicated in the model, the effects of none of these
controls is significant on subsequent presentation of verbal cues of urgency. However, the effect of
the interaction between initial verbal cues of urgency and confirmation of target suitability remains
significant. Notably though this model presents a relatively low pseudo R-squared value. Indeed, the
relatively low pseudo R-squared value may be a reason for concern in these models. However, it
should be noted that the only true utility of pseudo R-squared in non-parametric model is in
comparing the Pseudo R-squared values against other pseudo R-squared values of the same type,
generated from the same data, on the same outcome (Long & Freeze, 2006). Much like pseudo RSquared values, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values could also be calculated in order to
estimate which model is more parsimonious, and fits the data better. Both the pseudo R-squared and
AIC values reported for these models suggest that Model 3 represent a substantial improvement over
both Model 1 and Model 2, and that the effect of this interaction term is not trivial in the model.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
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To visualize the magnitude of this effect we plot in Figure 1 the predicted probability of
subsequent verbal cues of urgency for online scammers who either incorporated urgency verbal cues
in their probe email or did not, and who either received a confirmation of target suitability or did not.
As indicated in the figure, the predicted probability of verbal cues of urgency in subsequent
communication between online fraudsters and our research team ranges between 63% and 67% when
scammers are not presented with confirmation of target suitability. However, the predicted
probability of subsequent verbal cues of urgency is 89% when confirmation of target suitability is
presented in response to probe emails with urgency words. In contrast, the predicted probability of
subsequent verbal cues of urgency is 61% when confirmation of target suitability is presented in
response to probe emails with no urgency words.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
To test our third research hypothesis and assess whether the presentation of verbal cues of
urgency is synchronized with non-verbal cues of urgency throughout the progression of an online
non-payment fraud attempt, we estimated the effect of initial verbal cues of urgency on the number of
follow-up email communications between online scammers and our research team, using a Negative
Binomial Regression. Results from this analysis are presented in Table 3, Model 1. As indicated in
the model, the effect of scammers’ presentation of verbal cues of urgency in the probe email is
significant and positive, suggesting that the presence of initial verbal cues of urgency significantly
increases the frequency of email communication between online scammers and the research team.
Next, we estimate the effect of the interaction term between verbal cues of urgency and
confirmation of target suitability on the number of follow-up email communications between online
scammers and our conversation engine. Findings from this analysis are reported in Table 3, Model 2.
In line with the findings reported when predicting subsequent verbal cues of urgency, the effect of the
interaction between verbal cues of urgency and confirmation of target suitability is significant and
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positive on the number of email communications between online scammers and the conversation
engine. This finding supports the assumption that confirmation of target suitability enhances the
effect of initial verbal cues of urgency on subsequent presentation of non-verbal cues of urgency.
Finally, we re-run the model while introducing the list of controls and accounting for potential
confounding effects on both the dependent and independent variables. Findings from this model are
reported in Table 3, Model 3. Note that the effects of cellphone, computers, and jewelry ads are
significant and positive in the model. In contrast, the effect of major metropolitan measure is
significant and negative. Still, the effect of the interaction term between initial verbal cues of urgency
and confirmation of target suitability remains significant in the model, suggesting that the interactive
effect is not trivial. Moreover, both the pseudo R-squared and AIC values reported for these models
suggest that Model 3 represent a substantial improvement over both Model 1 and Model 2.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
To visualize the magnitude of this effect, in Figure 2 we plot the predicted number of email
communications between online scammers and the research team for online scammers who either
incorporated urgency verbal cues in their probe email or did not, and for scammers who either
received a confirmation of target suitability or did not. As indicated in the figure, the predicted
number of email communications between online scammers and the research team is 2.3 emails on
average when scammers are not presented with confirmation of target suitability. However, the
predicted number of email communications between online scammers and the research team is 3.6
emails when confirmation of target suitability is presented in response to probe emails with urgency
words. In contrast, the predicted number of email communications between online scammers and the
research team is only 1.9 emails when confirmation of target suitability is presented in response to
probe emails with no urgency words.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
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Sensitivity analysis
Although the findings presented so far support our research hypotheses, one may suggests that by
focusing our analyses on the 623 email threads in which we received a fake payment notification
only, it is impossible to discern whether the observed patterns are unique to online offenders. Indeed,
it could be the case that legitimate online consumers who are in a rush to purchase an item online
adopt a similar strategy to that we observed among online fraudsters. Therefore, ideally, our
assessments of the four research hypotheses should also include an exploration of the way potential
online consumers (i.e. non-fraudsters) employ both verbal and non-verbal cues of urgency during
their interactions with online sellers. In order to address this issue, we re-estimated all the models we
reported above using data from the 517 email threads that did not include a fraudulent payment
notification. Since none of these email-threads included concrete evidence for an online fraud
attempt, we suspect that these email communications may have been with legitimate online
consumers who were genuinely interested in purchasing the advertised items. Results from these
analyses (see Appendix C for the findings from all re-estimated models) reveal that none of the
verbal and non-verbal consistencies of urgency we observed among online-fraudsters are evident
among non-fraudsters. Moreover, confirmation of item availability does not moderate the effect of
initial verbal cues of urgency on subsequent verbal and non-verbal cues of urgency.
[TABLE 4 HERE]
DISCUSSION
Despite the growing public and legal interest in online fraud, and the potential of the social sciences
to guide both technical and policy efforts to prevent and mitigate this phenomenon, relatively little
attention has been given in the criminological literature to investigating fraudsters’ Modus Operandi
(Lea et al 2009), and their responses to situational stimuli during the progression of these criminal
events. To bridge this empirical gap we adopted the criminal event perspective (Meier et al 2001),
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and drew on claims from the Interpersonal Deception Theory (Buller and Burgoon 1996) to explore
whether verbal and non-verbal cues of urgency are presented consistently to online-fraud targets
throughout the progression of an online non-payment fraud attempt. Moreover, integrating Buller and
Burgoon’s (1996) claims with situational explanations of crime (Briar and Pilavin 1965; Osgood et
al. 1996), we explored whether the confirmation that a situation is conducive to online fraud impacts
the presentation of urgency cues throughout the progression of an online non-payment fraud attempt.
Analyzing data collected through unique email communications between online fraudsters and our
research team revealed several key findings.
First, in contrast to previous research that analyzed the content of spam emails and reported
that many online scammers employ verbal cues of urgency when contacting their victims with
different fraudulent propositions (Wang et al. 2012), we find that verbal cues of urgency in initial
probe emails sent to potential targets of non-payment fraud are relatively rare, with only 18% of the
probe emails received in our email inboxes incorporating verbal cues of urgency like “fast,” “soon,”
and “ASAP.” Similarly, only 20% of the probe emails actively sought to confirm the target’s
suitability by attempting to gather intelligence about the target condition and functionality. Future
research should explore how common the use of other persuasive approaches (for example authority,
social proof, and liking (Ferreria and Lezini 2015)) is in the context of online fraud in general, and in
non-payment/non-delivery fraud attempts in particular.
Second, we find some evidence that verbal cues of urgency are more likely to be incorporated
in fraudsters’ subsequent emails to targets if verbal cues of urgency were included in the fraudster’s
initial probe email, compared to threads where such cues were absent from the initial probe.
Moreover, we find that confirmation of target suitability increases online fraudsters’ consistent use of
verbal cues of urgency throughout the progression of the online fraud attempt, if the initial probe
email included verbal cues of urgency. These first of its kind “context-embedded” findings support
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Buller and Burgoon’s (1996) suggestion that in the absence of clear signs of suspicion from targets,
deceivers are likely to display consistent strategic online behaviors throughout the progression of
online fraud. However, the estimated model fit values calculated for these models suggest that these
findings should be interpreted cautiously.
Third, consistent with the assumption that fraudsters employ both verbal and non-verbal
deceptive cues during their interactions with victims, we observed that the volume of email messages
sent to potential targets is significantly higher among scammers who incorporated verbal cues of
urgency in their probe emails, compared to scammers who did not incorporate initial verbal cues of
urgency in their probe emails. This pattern is consistent with the pattern observed by Shichor and
associates (2001) in the context of telemarketing fraudsters, and offers support to the suggestion that
computer-mediated environments could support the transmission of nonverbal cues in general
(Derrick et al. 2013) and the transmission of non-verbal urgency cues in particular.
Finally, we found supporting evidence for our last research hypothesis, suggesting that the
confirmation of target suitability enhances the effect of initial verbal cues of urgency on the
frequency of email communication between online scammers who employ verbal cues of urgency
and potential targets. Specifically, we reported that the confirmation of target suitability increases the
volume of email messages sent to potential targets by online fraudsters if the initial probe email
included verbal cues of urgency. Indeed, we believe that targets’ willingness to share details about the
availability of situations conducive to crime is perceived by online scammers as a sign of compliance,
and results in subsequent presentation of non-verbal cues of urgency that coincide with the urgency
façade (Buller and Burgoon 1996).
The findings reported in our paper emphasize the relevance of the criminal event perspective
in understanding the dynamics of online fraud, and expand the body of criminological literature that
has already investigated key insights from this perspective in the context of violent crime (Luckenbill
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1977; Meier et al. 2001). Moreover, our seminal findings demonstrate the importance of situations
conducive to online fraud for determining offenders’ presentation of deceptive cues while attempting
to defraud their victims. Future research should further explore how the emergence of situations
conducive to online crime dictates the presentation of other known deceptive cues (for instance,
authority and kindness (Ferreria and Lezini 2015)) throughout the progression of an online fraud. We
suspect that such future work should further apply insights from Buller and Burgoon’s (1994, 1996)
Interpersonal Deception Theory. In parallel, we believe that efforts should be devoted to the
development of a more comprehensive criminological theory that can investigate and predict the
progression of a criminal event.
Besides the important theoretical contribution of this research to the criminological literature,
we believe that this work also carries practical implications for spam filter designers and
organizations that attempt to detect and prevent online fraud victimization. Specifically, we know that
email providers consistently calibrate their spam filters to try and prevent spam emails from ending
up in email users’ inboxes. Unfortunately, these spam filters do not completely prevent spam email
from arriving to potential targets (Jakobson and Leedy 2016). The approach we bring paves a path for
the design of new tools that could monitor the series of interactions occurring during the progression
of a criminal event in effort to detect, flag, and block them from result in victimization.
Still, this work is not without limitations. First, in many instances the classified ad website
flagged and deleted our advertisements from their servers. Although we were unable to identify a
systematic reason as to why some advertisements were removed, we have no reason to believe that
this issue impacted the results obtained, as scammers were presumably as likely to respond and to use
urgency cues for these ads as for any others. Second, we did not initiate contact with potential
consumers and scammers who did not have the ad’s subject line in the header. Relatedly, although
the key words we choose as a trigger for response appeared frequently in both a pilot study we
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conducted, as well as used by other scholars to set email filters (Horvitz and Apacible 2009), future
research should investigate whether responses to other words change online fraudsters’ responses,
and the progression of an online fraud event. Finally, we cannot really identify the individuals who
contacted us throughout the data collection period, and assess their demographic characteristics
(Button and Cross 2017), personality traits (Holtfreter, Reisig, and Pratt 2008), or motivations
behinds their responses to our advertisements. Collecting such data could have improved our models’
predictability. Moreover, we cannot determine with a very high level of confidence if the exchanges
we had over 1,140 email responses were with unique or overlapping online consumers/scammers.
However, we believe that since the unit of analysis in this work is the progression of a criminal event
this generate less of an issue5. Therefore, despite these limitations, we believe that this paper
contributes to our understanding of the development of online fraud events, and provides additional
evidence for the promise embedded in criminological research for guiding the detection, mitigation,
and prevention of online crimes.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (N=623 Email Threads)
Variable
Mean Std. Dev. Min-Max
Dependent Variables
Subsequent Non-Verbal Cue of Urgency (# of emails)
Subsequent Verbal Cues of Urgency

2.59
0.70

2.35
0.45

0.12
0.24
0.28
0.36
138.80

0.49
0.42
0.45
0.48
158.40

Ad location
Major metropolitan

0.45

0.50

0-1

Scammer’s First Email Content
Initial Verbal Cues of Urgency

0.18

0.38

0-1

Research Team Response
Confirmation of target suitability

0.20

0.40

0-1

Independent Variables
Ad Content
Auto part
Cellphone
Computers
Jewelry
Price ($)

30

0-15
0-1

0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1
11-700

Variables

Table 2. Subsequent Verbal Cues of Urgency Regressed Over Ad Features and
Scammers’ Initial Correspondence with Targets (N=623 Email Threads)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Coeff
Odds Coeff
Odds
Coeff Odds
(SE)
Ratio
(SE)
Ratio
(SE)
Ratio

Scammers’ First Email Content
Initial Verbal Cues of Urgency

.51+
(.30)

1.66

.10
(.35)

1.10

.17
(.36)

1.18

Research Team Response
Confirmation of target suitability

-

-

-.18
(.21)

.83

-.10
(.21)

.90

Interaction
Confirmation of target suitability ×
Initial Verbal Cues of Urgency

-

-

1.66*
(.85)

5.29

1.60*
(.85)

4.60

Ad Content a
Cellphone

-

-

-

-

.65

Computers

-

-

-

-

Jewelry

-

-

-

-

Price ($)

-

-

-

-

-.43
(.31)
.13
(.33)
-.69
(.28)
-.01
(.01)

-

-

-

-

-.02
(.17)

.98

.52***
(.09)

.56***
(.10)

-

1.07***
(.21)

-

.05
817.3
-406.65**

.05
816.45
-404.25**

Ad Location
Major metropolitan

Constant

Pseudo-R²
AIC
Log Likelihood
a

Reference category = auto parts
+p ≤ .10; *p ≤ .05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
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.09
804.70
-397.36**

1.13
.50
.98

Table 3. Subsequent Non-Verbal Cues of Urgency Regressed Over Ad Features and Scammers’
Initial Correspondence with Targets (N=623 Email Threads)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Variables
Coeff
Event
Coeff
Event
Coeff Event
(SE)
Ratio
(SE)
Ratio
(SE)
Ratio
Scammers’ First Email Content
Initial Verbal Cues of Urgency

.27*
(.11)

1.31

.06
(.14)

1.06

.01
(.14)

1.01

Research Team Response
Confirmation of target suitability

-

-

-.12
(.09)

.89

-.18
(.09)

.84

Interaction
Confirmation of target suitability ×
Initial Verbal Cues of Urgency

-

-

.60**
(.23)

1.83

.61**
(.23)

1.85

Ad Content a
Cellphone

-

-

-

-

1.61

Computers

-

-

-

-

Jewelry

-

-

-

-

Price ($)

-

-

-

-

.48***
(.13)
.29*
(.14)
.51***
(.12)
-.00
(.00)

-

-

-

-

-.18**
(.07)

.83

.82***
(.04)
-1.22
.05
2450.47
-1193.63**

-

.53***
(.11)
-1.33
.11
2438.60
-1178.53**

-

Ad Location
Major metropolitan

Constant
Ln alpha
Pseudo-R²
AIC
Log Likelihood

.80***
(.04)
-1.19
.04
2455.90
-1196.95**

a

Reference category = auto parts
+p ≤ .10; *p ≤ .05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
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1.34
1.66
.99

Figure 1. Predicted Probability of Verbal Cues of Urgency at Follow Up (N = 623 Email
Threads)
100%
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Figure 2. Predicted Number of Subsequent Email Responses (N = 623 Email Threads)
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ENDNOTES
1

The strategic behaviors and communication patterns that could be employed by deceivers include delivering false and
ambiguous messages to their targets, creating distance between themselves and others, and presenting an image of a
sincere and trustworthy individual.
2

In order not to interfere with the regular ad traffic on the website, we made sure that our advertisements accounted for
only a small fraction of the total ads volume in each of the cities.
3

No significant differences were found between the type of products and locations of advertisement that were deleted by
the website owner and those that were not.
We adhered to the classified ad website’s terms of use and restricted each of our accounts to posting in a single location,
and at a posting rate of once every 48 hours.
4

5

In analysis not shown, we restricted our sample to include email threads in which the content of the first email received
in our email inboxes was significantly different across other first emails we received. Indeed, since the content of the first
email we received from some of the potential costumers/online scammers was identical in 4% of the cases, one may
suggest that those emails were sent from the same individuals. Re-estimating all the models reported in this manuscript
while restricting the sample to email thread with “unique” first emails yielded consistent results to those reported in the
manuscript.
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